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1 Introduction
Limiting climate change to well below 2  C requires a swift reduction in global
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. A cost-e↵ective option is to set a price on
CO2 either with an emissions trading system or an emissions tax. Some re-
gions already have a pricing mechanism in place (e.g. EU ETS and California
Cap-and-Trade), but a global system is currently unavailable under the vary-
ing political and economic circumstances. Therefore, it is likely for individual
countries, or coalitions of countries, to continue with stringent unilateral car-
bon pricing while others show only a limited interest in climate action.
The sub-global carbon price has raised concerns about free-riding and
carbon leakage. Especially the emission-intensive and trade-exposed (EITE)
industries, such as iron and steel, cement, pulp and paper and chemicals, are
feared to su↵er competitiveness losses against their rivals in non-acting coun-
tries, resulting only in emission relocation instead of actual reductions. EU
ETS, the first and currently the biggest carbon market, is at the fore of such
fears. To avoid leakage, carbon-based trade restrictions have been proposed
against countries that lack a comparable pricing scheme. One alternative is
carbon tari↵s — more generally, border carbon adjustments (BCA) — where
goods entering the customs territory of EU are taxed according to their car-
bon content and the prevailing price of EU emission allowances. Never tested
and possibly harmful for trade relations, the concept was included in the re-
vised ETS directive with a delicate phrasing. It states that the EU could
apply requirements to importers. . . for example by requiring the surrender of
allowances, as long as the requirements are not less favourable than what
they are for European producers (European Commission, 2009).
Border carbon adjustment is appealing for several reasons. First, it would
curb carbon leakage. Heavy industry groups, particularly in the metals sec-
tor, have welcomed tari↵s as a means to level the global playing field skewed
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by emissions trading (European Parliament, 2014, 2015). Linking together
trade and climate policies could also address the shortcomings in CO2 ac-
counting methodology. Currently, each country only reports emissions that
are produced within its national borders. The imported share of EU’s con-
sumption is thereby excluded from the EU emissions inventory and the EU’s
GHG reduction targets. As a result of growing international trade, however,
emission transfers have increased considerably — mainly from developing to
developed countries (Peters et al., 2011). Imposing a carbon tari↵ would
take the entire consumption into consideration, as the increasing price of
carbon-intensive goods steers consumption to cleaner substitutes.
In addition, the post-2020 reform of EU ETS is focused on leakage issues
and updated rules of free allocation (Erbach, 2016), both of which could be
tackled with border carbon adjustment. During ETS Phase 3 (2013-2020),
nearly one billion free allowances are being allocated annually to industries
that are deemed at risk of carbon leakage (EUTL, 2016). The generous
allocation method has caused unwanted side-e↵ects, including excess pro-
duction in order to secure a maximum amount of future permits (Branger
et al., 2015) and substantial heavy industry windfall profits (Laing et al.,
2014). Introducing a BCA system would be a leap towards full auctioning as
simultaneous free allocation and border adjusting could hardly be justified
(Monjon and Quirion, 2011). Last, as Condon and Ignaciuk (2013) point
out, trade restrictions can even be used to pressure non-acting countries to
a more active contribution in future climate agreements.
There are also drawbacks aplenty. A detailed approximation of emissions
embodied in trade is extremely data-intensive. Take for example aluminium,
which in 2014 was imported to the EU from over 100 di↵erent countries
(UN Comtrade, 2015). Acquiring verifiable emission data for each country,
not to mention each production facility, is simply impractical. It is also
unclear whether a border adjustment policy can be fine-tuned to comply with
international trade agreements. A protectionist attempt would be overturned
by the WTO dispute settlement body. Even after an approval from the WTO,
if considered unjust by other countries, any form of tari↵s might provoke
trade retaliation.
Besides, not all businesses benefit from a new trade barrier. The con-
sequent increase in domestic prices could be detrimental to those manufac-
turing industries that rely on a high share of imported intermediate goods.
Moreover, a unilateral carbon tari↵ only protects industries within the inter-
nal market. Globally exporting European firms would still face the uneven
2
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playing field outside the EU, only this time with the soaring price of inputs
(Bo¨hringer et al., 2014). Last, no empirical evidence of carbon leakage has
yet been discovered in the EU (Bolscher et al., 2013). It doesn’t necessarily
make the border adjustment policy any less useful, but suggests that it is
often supported with tenuous arguments.
In this thesis, the FINAGE applied general equilibrium (AGE) model of
the Finnish economy is used to estimate the impacts of a hypothetical EU
carbon tari↵. The main questions are whether a globally integrated small
economy can benefit from a climate-motivated tari↵, and if not, does the
magnitude of environmental gains still justify its use?
A tari↵ reflecting the EU ETS allowance price is imposed in 2016 on all
non-European emission-intensive imports and simulated until 2030. Results
are presented with a top-down approach, from macroeconomic indicators to
a sector-specific analysis. The underlying mechanisms behind the results are
explained both through the immediate tari↵ impacts and the more gradual
wage adaptation that follows the shock. This is in contrast to the vast
majority of existing BCA literature, typically covering more regions, but
focusing merely on carbon leakage and competitiveness issues. This thesis
is also the first in-depth quantitative modelling study of BCA impacts in
Finland.
The rest of this study is structured as follows: a brief literature review and
the theoretical framework are presented in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 presents
the FINAGE model, and Chapter 4 the additional data that are required to
quantify the carbon tari↵. Chapter 5 shows the results, and their robust-
ness is tested in Chapter 6. The results are further discussed in Chapter 7.
Chapter 8 concludes.
3
2 Literature
2.1 Theory
This study builds on an extensive literature on using tari↵s to tackle trans-
boundary pollution stemming from foreign production processes. Markusen
(1975) presented a simple general equilibrium model of two countries that
produce and trade two goods. The negative production externalities were
addressed by a tax either on production, consumption or trade. Markusen
showed that in a case of foreign pollution, welfare is maximized with a policy
mix that consists of a domestic production tax and an import tari↵. Markusen
also presented a numeric illustration of several second-best scenarios where
only one tax alternative is available due to political constraints. Ranking of
the second-best optimums is highly sensitive to the actual product mix, but
tari↵s still yielded a higher welfare relative to the reference scenario that had
no government intervention. Copeland (1996) has a very similar approach
with a simple two-country model. He further specifies that a pollution con-
tent tari↵ that reflects the actual foreign process emissions should be used.
Copeland also highlights the strategic use of tari↵s by arguing that the tari↵-
induced increase in environmental regulation abroad creates more demand
for environmental services, which can then be exploited by the home country.
Hoel (1996) uses a more generalized model of several countries. He maxi-
mizes a domestic welfare function that consists of utility from consumption
of goods, but also environmental degradation from production-related use
of fossil fuels. The study includes two alternative methods to tackle car-
bon leakage: carbon tari↵s on imports and tax exemptions for trade-exposed
domestic industries. Similarly to Markusen, also Hoel concluded that an
optimal domestic policy combines a carbon tax on production with an im-
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port tari↵. Furthermore, he argued that domestic carbon tax exemptions
should only be available in a special case where tari↵s are for some reason
unavailable. His explanation was that solving the optimal combination of a
uniform carbon tax and a tari↵ is more straightforward than reaching the
same level of welfare by using only di↵erentiated domestic taxes. High data
requirements should thereby not be used as an argument against tari↵s and
to justify tax exemptions for domestic industries.
Many authors suggest that an environmentally motivated trade policy is
beneficial also from the global point of view. According to a partial equilib-
rium study by Maestad (1998), both import tari↵s and export rebates should
be available. The optimal instrument depends on whether the environmental
harm is local or global, and whether it originates from consumption (ozone
depletion) or production activities (acid rain). Again, the underlying as-
sumption throughout his work is that a Pigouvian tax is set on all domestic
production externalities. Gros (2009), also using a partial equilibrium model,
narrowed the scope of global welfare analysis explicitly on carbon tari↵s. He
found that the welfare losses from lower consumption at home were out-
weighed by an increase in global social welfare. The positive net impact
was driven by diminishing foreign production that also caused the associated
negative production externalities to decrease.
2.2 Tari↵ impacts
Recent numeric studies are less unanimous about the overall desirability of
border carbon adjustments. The main impacts are clear, but the distri-
butional e↵ects and the extent of foreign counter-measures remain much
debated. This section presents the relevant literature regarding these is-
sues. Virtually all use multi-regional computable general equilibrium (CGE)
models, which are the established method for studying international trade
policies.
Many authors conclude that border carbon adjustments tackle carbon
leakage e↵ectively. Bo¨hringer et al. (2012a) and Winchester et al. (2011)
estimate that a BCA on emission-intensive industries reduces carbon leakage
on average by a third. A meta-analysis of 25 BCA studies by Branger and
Quirion (2014) shows even higher figures: leakage rate more than halved from
an average of 14 percent to an average of 6 percent. Manders and Veenendaal
(2008) focused explicitly on the EU, and found that leakage rate fell from
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3,3 percent to 0,5 percent when border measures were introduced.
All industries, however, will not benefit equally. Steel (Mathiesen and
Maestad, 2004) and cement (Demailly and Quirion, 2008) sectors have a lot
to gain in terms of leakage protection, whereas the leakage rate in minerals
sector is hardly a↵ected at all (Kuik and Hofkes, 2010). This is because car-
bon leakage occurs through di↵erent channels. The competitiveness channel
— that is, additional costs to firms from domestic climate policy — can be
directly compensated with border carbon adjustments. Leakage through the
energy market channel means that falling domestic demand for fossil fuels
lowers their global market price and thereby encourages consumption abroad.
This channel is beyond the reach of border adjustments (Schinko et al., 2014).
The overall economic impacts of BCA are typically estimated to be small
and unevenly distributed between di↵erent countries. Babiker and Ruther-
ford (2005) and Lanzi et al. (2012) found that border carbon adjusting is
beneficial for domestic competitiveness, but causes substantial welfare losses
outside the tari↵ area. Mattoo et al. (2009) studied the impacts of BCA
using the World Bank ENVISAGE model, designed particularly to analyse
the distributional impacts of climate policy. They concluded more generally
that rich countries will benefit from border adjustment at the expense of the
poor. Foure´ et al. (2016) drew similar conclusions in a modelling study that
focused only on Europe. Imports to the EU decreased — as predicted —
causing a slight boost in domestic production. Goods originally destined
for EU markets, however, were re-routed to other destinations. It caused
increased competition and production losses elsewhere.
The magnitude of impacts mainly depends on the structure of domestic
industry. According to Bo¨hringer et al. (2014), the US non-ferrous metal
sector was able to increase its production when the unilateral emission pric-
ing scheme was supplemented with a carbon tari↵ on imports. A similar
policy applied in Switzerland, on the other hand, caused the output to dete-
riorate. This is because the Swiss industry uses a higher share of imported
intermediates and is more oriented to global markets. It is therefore more
vulnerable to trade shocks. Also Winchester et al. (2011) and Dissou and
Eyland (2011) found that carbon tari↵s have negative impacts on domestic
production due to the increase in material costs. Burniaux et al. (2013) and
Monjon and Quirion (2010) showed that the increase in general price level
and the following decrease in domestic demand can even outweigh the gains
from a protective tari↵.
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Border carbon adjustment has only a minor impact on emissions. Winch-
ester et al. (2011) estimated that emissions inside the tari↵ area fall by 0,8
percent and the global emissions by 0,6 percent. In their study, the act-
ing coalition was responsible for a relatively small share of global emissions.
Therefore, even a big drop in leakage rate translates only to a small reduc-
tion in absolute emissions. Dong and Whalley (2009) studied the changes in
energy-related emissions when the EU imposes border measures against the
US and China. EU emissions fell by 0,1 - 0,8 percent, depending on the car-
bon price. However, a simultaneous increase in foreign energy use cancelled
out the impact on total global emissions.
In the absence of empirical evidence, the political consequences of border
carbon adjustment remain unclear. Helm et al. (2012) viewed BCA from a
game theoretic point of view, and concluded that they are able to reduce
trade distortions and to build a larger climate coalition. A Nash equilibrium
game constructed by Bo¨hringer et al. (2016b), however, pointed out that
this leverage might not be strong enough to engage big countries like Russia
and China to regulate their emissions. Some authors suggest that a border
adjustment policy might even provoke a trade war (Foure´ et al., 2016; Dro¨ge
et al., 2009).
2.3 The legality of trade restrictions
Another major issue impeding the introduction of border carbon adjustments
is the possible inconsistency with international trade agreements. In the
World Trade Organization, any of the more than 150 member countries can
file a formal complaint against unfavourable trade measures adopted by an-
other member. If a bilateral round of consultations fails to resolve the issue, a
wider dispute settlement panel is formed (WTO, 2015b). China and India, for
instance, have already threatened to trigger a WTO dispute if carbon tari↵s
are used against them (ICTSD, 2010; Voituriez and Wang, 2011). However,
several recent studies conclude that when carefully planned, border carbon
adjustment is likely to turn out WTO-compatible (Horn and Mavroidis, 2011;
Pauwelyn, 2012; Ismer and Neuho↵, 2007; Monjon and Quirion, 2010).
The requirements for legitimate border measures are documented in The
General Agreement on Tari↵s and Trade. It forbids all discrimination be-
tween like products from di↵erent importing countries and charges of any kind
in excess of those applied to like domestic products (GATT, 1986). However,
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the likeness of a domestic product and its physically identical but more pol-
luting foreign substitute is open to interpretation. The ruling is made case-
by-case in accordance to their tari↵ classifications, cross-price elasticities, and
end-use purposes (Horn and Mavroidis, 2011). In cases like border carbon ad-
justment, the interpretation is likely to favour the appellant and prohibit the
di↵erent tax treatment of otherwise similar products based on mere process-
related di↵erences (Low et al., 2012). This conclusion is supported by a
previous case law, where the WTO panel blocked the US-established import
requirements on Venezuelan and Brazilian gasoline (WTO, 1996).
Even after proving the likeness of two rival goods, challenging a dispute
is extremely laborious for the appellant. Next, it should be able to prove
that the treatment of imports is less favourable compared to domestic goods.
However, as long as the emission pricing and the estimation of embodied
carbon are consistent with the EU ETS, no rules are being violated (Horn
and Mavroidis, 2011). Furthermore, the GATT article XX allows deviating
from the rules if the measures are either necessary to protect human, animal
or planet life or health or relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources (GATT, 1986). The necessity of border measures is uncertain (Is-
mer and Neuho↵, 2007), but clean air was actually declared as an exhaustible
resource during the US gasoline dispute (WTO, 1996). Moreover, the pre-
vious WTO review processes have taken a more considerate approach for
policies that relate to protecting public health (Horn and Mavroidis, 2011).
The environmental exceptions thus seem like a solid last resort to justify the
use of BCA, if needed.
Only a handful of previous dispute settlement outcomes can be directly
applied to assess the legality of carbon-based trade measures. In the US-
Superfund case (WTO, 1987), the US was allowed to extend its list of do-
mestically banned chemicals with a tax on imports that contain those same
chemicals. The Superfund case is significant for border carbon adjustment
because it wasn’t necessary for the chemicals to be physically in the imported
product, as long as they were used as process inputs (Pauwelyn, 2007). The
environmental exceptions in Article XX were for the first time successfully
invoked in the EC-Asbestos case, where the WTO panel approved the French
ban on Canadian asbestos-containing construction materials, highlighting the
health attributes of otherwise perfectly competitive products (Sander, 2015).
Importantly, those foreign exporters that can prove their production to be
cleaner than the European standard should be exempted from the tari↵. In
1994, the Finnish government imposed a uniform excise tax on all imported
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electricity (Law on excise duty on certain sources of energy, 1473/1994). The
law was challenged by Outokumpu, an electricity-importing steel manufac-
turer, claiming that a flat rate on all imports is discriminatory in comparison
with the more detailed rates that are applied to domestic production. The
European Court of Justice followed this argument and blocked the law that
even in some cases could lead to an unjust treatment of imports (CJEU,
1998).
It is also worth noting that while border carbon adjustments have never
been used, the EU is not the first to attempt. The closest so far is the Amer-
ican Clean Energy and Security Act, which would have required foreign ex-
porters to surrender emission allowances for goods that enter the US customs
territory (US Congress, 2009). The bill was eventually rejected by the Senate.
More successfully, the US used an import tari↵ to enforce Montreal Proto-
col, the agreement prohibiting the use of ozone-depleting substances. The
legality of this measure was never challenged to a WTO dispute settlement
(Winchester et al., 2011).
Last, as Low et al. (2012) conclude, the GATT text was compiled well be-
fore the mainstream awareness of climate change. Some authors have there-
fore argued that the trade agreements should be updated according to a more
recent scientific outlook (Wiers, 2008). The current WTO stance is approv-
ing for carefully crafted border adjustments for climate motives (Tamiotti
et al., 2009). Firger and Gerrard (2011) remark that currently the main
causes for WTO disputes are clean technology subsidies, not protectionist
trade measures.
2.4 Tari↵ design issues
This section reviews alternative carbon tari↵ designs from the previous lit-
erature. The focus here is to deal with the simplifying assumptions that are
necessary to conduct this study and to implement the actual tari↵.
A detailed estimation of embodied carbon for every imported commodity
is virtually impossible. Ismer and Neuho↵ (2007) and Godard (2007) sug-
gest the use of a best available technology (BAT) benchmark. It leads to an
inevitable underestimation of the carbon content, but it also has two major
advantages. First, it would be much simpler to implement, which improves
the feasibility of BCA significantly. Second, it would reduce the risk of trade
retaliation by treating foreign export sectors more gently. For instance, a
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US carbon tari↵ based on actual emissions is estimated to cut Chinese man-
ufacturing exports by 20 percent (Mattoo et al., 2009), more than enough
to provoke counter-measures. A possible version of the BAT approach for
the EU is to tax imported carbon according to domestic process standards.
This is a likely alternative as the free allocation of emission allowances under
the EU ETS is already based on a benchmark of the most e cient domestic
installations (European Commission, 2011).
Whether the amount of imported carbon is estimated using a domes-
tic benchmark or the actual process emissions has only a small impact on
BCA results (Burniaux et al., 2013; Demailly and Quirion, 2008; Mattoo
et al., 2009). The downside of domestic benchmarks is that setting the tari↵
according to an EU reference hardly o↵ers an incentive for foreign produc-
ers to cut their emissions. Ismer and Neuho↵ (2007) remind that it might
also passivate the EU producers, as making substantial energy e ciency im-
provements would decrease the taxation of their foreign rivals. A global
benchmark would overcome this issue. According to Balistreri et al. (2014)
and Bo¨hringer et al. (2016a) the optimal tari↵ rate is in any case smaller
than what the domestic carbon price would imply, because the redirection of
polluting imports encourages consumption outside the tari↵ area.
A tari↵ on imports is not the only possible form of border carbon ad-
justment. BCA can also be used as an export rebate, an obligation for
importers to surrender emission allowances, or a combination of these (Kuik
and Hofkes, 2010). According to Monjon and Quirion (2010), the most suit-
able option for the EU is a system that covers both imports and exports, as it
would be the most e cient in reducing carbon leakage and global emissions
in a WTO-compatible manner. However, many authors disregard the export
compensation as either ine cient (Gros, 2009), illegal subsidies (Bo¨hringer
et al., 2014), restraint on domestic emission reductions (Dro¨ge et al., 2009),
or irrelevant to the tari↵ outcome (Steininger et al., 2012).
The next design question is the proper use of tari↵ revenue. Many recent
studies suggest that all revenue should be recycled back to the exporting
country either directly or in a form of international clean development funds
(Branger and Quirion, 2014; Taylor and Grubb, 2011; Springmann, 2012;
Eckersley, 2010; Steininger et al., 2014). It would leave the targeted countries
with fewer arguments to engage in trade retaliation, but also compensate
for the possible losses in global welfare. Knopf et al. (2014) even suggest
that the EU could negotiate its trading partners to implement an export tax
themselves. It would have an identical outcome to a revenue recycling import
10
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tari↵, only with less administration for the EU. Export taxes are already
in place in many developing countries. They are used to shift economic
activity from exporting natural resources towards manufacturing of higher
value-added goods (OECD, 2010; Voituriez and Wang, 2011).
This study supplements the previous literature on carbon tari↵s by us-
ing a single-country general equilibrium model. Rest of the world is treated
exogenously, which means that some feedback e↵ects from changing interna-
tional trade patterns will unavoidably go unnoticed. On the other hand, the
single-country approach enables a substantially more detailed examination
of tari↵ impacts on the domestic economy. As the data availability is less of
a problem, industries and other economic actors can be described more ex-
tensively. Having more detailed data means that the model can also produce
more detailed simulation results. Therefore, the results presented in this the-
sis will mainly be focused on how the tari↵ shock a↵ects the economy as a
whole, whereas the previous literature has mainly studied the tari↵ impacts
on global competitiveness and carbon leakage.
In summary, the following definitions will be used in this study based on
the previous literature. The carbon content of imports is estimated using a
benchmark of average EU production emissions. Export rebates are excluded,
and the border carbon adjustment policy only includes a tari↵ on imports.
Hence, BCA and carbon tari↵s are used as synonyms. The collected tari↵
revenue is recycled back to the country of origin in full.
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3.1 Overview
The tari↵ impacts are modelled using FINAGE , an applied general equilib-
rium (AGE) model of the Finnish economy based on Honkatukia (2009) and
Honkatukia and Dixon (2015). AGE models (also referred as Computable
General Equilibrium, CGE) are an increasingly popular instrument for the
quantitative analysis of di↵erent policy proposals, what if -questions and eco-
nomic shocks. They are especially useful in situations where the proposed
policy has a divergent impact on di↵erent actors — industries, regions, or
household types — and winners and losers are di cult to tell apart with
other methods.
AGE models are an aggregate of economic theory, behavioural assump-
tions and statistical data. The structure of FINAGE is illustrated in Figure
3.1. By default, each economic agent acts rationally according to a number of
supply and demand functions. The observed real and financial transactions
quantify these conditions, and link the theoretical approach to real world
data. A detailed representation of the public sector is an essential feature
of the model. It enables the assessment of virtually all forms of government
intervention, as all taxes, tari↵s, income transfers and public expenditure
can be modified. Rest of the world is included in the model through inter-
national trade, which is further divided into EU and non-EU components.
All variables are based on real data, which makes the model computable but
also highly data-intensive. The data are obtained mainly from input-output
tables and various other national datasets.
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Behavioural rulesTheory Real and financial flows
Consumer
Utility
maximisation
·Consumption
demand
· Labour supply
· Saving
·Consumption
·Hours worked
· Factor income
·Consumption
expenditure
·Tax outlays
· Income transfers
· Investment
Firms
Profit
maximisation
· Supply of goods
·Demand for labour
·Demand for capital
·Demand for material
input
· Investment
·Production
·Primary factor use
· Sales revenue
·Payments to
primary factors
·Taxes and subsidies
· Investment
Public sector
Policy
objectives
·Demand for labour
·Demand for capital
·Demand for
material inputs
·Taxation
·Re-distribution
·Production
·Primary factor use
· Sales revenue
·Payments to
primary factors
·Taxes and subsidies
· Investment
Rest of the world
Exogenous
·Export demand
· Import supply
·World market prices
· Import expenditure
·Export revenue
· Financial flows
Figure 3.1: The structure of an AGE model (Honkatukia, 2009).
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3.2 AGE Theory
This section o↵ers a brief introduction to the underlying theoretical features
that are relevant for this study. These include the demand structures for
a profit-maximising firm and a utility-maximising household as well as a
description of labour market dynamics. A more detailed summary of the
model, including the TABLO code syntax, is available by Honkatukia (2009).
Firms operate in a perfectly competitive market, where the level of output
is determined by the equality of marginal costs and the market price. The
model also takes into account taxes, transportation costs and retail trade
profits that add up to actual consumer prices. The economy is aggregated
to 97 industries and 144 commodities according to the Standard Industrial
Classification TOL 2008. One industry typically produces a multitude of
goods, and the model allows the change in relative prices also to change the
structure of output. This is especially useful for the energy commodities that
in many cases are either side streams or by-products from outside the actual
energy sector.
The model is based on a nested structure of functions. Figures 3.2 -
3.4 illustrate the decision-making process of a cost-minimising firm. The
top-level nest in Figure 3.2 depicts how production costs in each sector are
divided between intermediate goods, primary factors and other costs. The
latter includes all costs not specified elsewhere, for example the costs of
holding inventories. The Leontief production function indicates that all these
inputs are perfect complements and always used in a fixed proportion.
Activity level
Leontief
Primary factors and energy Other costsGood 1 Good C
up to
= Functional form
= Input or output
Figure 3.2: Top-level production nest (Honkatukia, 2009).
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Figure 3.3 specifies the firm’s demand for intermediate goods. They can
be acquired either from domestic, European or non-European sources. This
nest is also referred to as the Armington nest, for the constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) is set according to the Armington assumption (Arming-
ton, 1969). Many trade models assume all goods to be perfectly homogeneous
regardless of their country of origin. This is hardly the case in real life, but as
Armington stated, domestic and imported goods are actually imperfect sub-
stitutes. It makes a crucial di↵erence in trade analysis. For instance, if there
is a strong bias to favour domestic goods over imports, the lack of an Arming-
ton parameter could lead to overestimating the volume of international trade
(Blonigen and Wilson, 1999). Also in more general, elasticities are the key
behavioural parameters in AGE modelling, and even the slightest changes in
their values can have radical impacts on the simulation results. Estimates
for di↵erent substitution elasticities are readily available from econometric
literature both on the national and international level. In FINAGE, the
Armington value is specified separately for each commodity, and it can also
be di↵erentiated between consumption, investment and intermediate goods.
The lowest set of nests in Figure 3.4 shows the demand for primary factors
(land, labour and capital) and energy inputs. They can also be substituted
according to a CES parameter. Last, the demand for labour is further spec-
ified between di↵erent skill types following the Classification of Occupations
by Statistics Finland.
Good 1 Good C
CES CES
Imported
Good 1
EU
Domestic
Good 1
Imported
Good 1
Non-EU
Imported
Good 1
EU
Domestic
Good 1
Imported
Good 1
Non-EU
up to
= Functional form
= Input or output
Figure 3.3: Intermediate sourcing nest (Honkatukia, 2009).
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Primary factors and energy
CES
Primary factors Energy
CES CES
LabourLand Capital
Primary factor nest
CES
Labour
type 1
Labour
type O
Energy
type 1
Energy
type E
Energy nest
Skill nest
up to
up to
= Functional form
= Input or output
Figure 3.4: Primary factor and energy nest (Honkatukia, 2009).
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Households maximize their utility through consumption. They face con-
straints determined by the primary factor income and the public income
transfers they receive and the taxes they pay. As illustrated in Figure 3.5, the
selection between di↵erent goods is very similar to the intermediate sourcing
by firms. As a distinction, however, the decision-making process is modelled
using a non-homothetic Klein-Rubin utility function. It allows the budget
shares spent on di↵erent goods to change as the household income changes.
A typical example of this is that the share of income used on food and hous-
ing tends to be bigger in lower income households, but gradually decrease
when moving to higher income classes.
Household utility
Klein-Rubin
Good 1 Good C
CES CES
Imported
Good 1
EU
Domestic
Good 1
Imported
Good 1
Non-EU
Imported
Good 1
EU
Domestic
Good 1
Imported
Good 1
Non-EU
up to
= Functional form
= Input or output
Figure 3.5: Household demand (Honkatukia, 2009).
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Both households and firms make investments, guided by the expected rate
of return on capital. The main trend is that the capital-labour ratio K/L
remains constant in the long-run. Investments are always sector-specific, and
cannot be transferred between sectors without new investments taking place.
The FINAGE model is solved using the GEMPACK (General Equilibrium
Modelling Package) software (Harrison and Pearson, 2002). The modelling
begins by creating a baseline scenario for the simulation period. This forecast
compiles both historic data, future growth expectations, and industry-specific
expert estimates to capture the development and trends in the economy for
the coming years. The studied policy proposal is introduced as a shock to this
baseline reference. The simulation is then repeated, and results are presented
as a deviation between the baseline and the policy re-run. This study uses
FINAGE in its dynamic mode, which means that the simulation is performed
over time and for each year the database is updated. The solution of one year
works as the starting point for the subsequent one. The economy adapts to
shocks by changes in relative prices, which balances the supply and demand
for each of the solutions. The dynamic approach, however, multiplies the
computational workload. It can be lightened in the model closure, where the
split between exogenous variables (predetermined by user) and endogenous
variables (solved by the model) can be customised for each study application
individually.
The reaction of labour markets is a key determinant in the way di↵erent
shocks are being passed through the economy. The basic approach in AGE
modelling is that the adjustment of wages clears the labour market after the
shock has been introduced. In this study, it is further assumed that due to
a somewhat centralized wage setting, the adjustment of wages is sluggish. It
means that real wages are fixed in the short-run and the wage adjustment
only takes place in the long-run, causing short-run changes in employment.
The assumption of wage rigidities is modelled in the policy simulation with
the following equation:
(
Wt
Wt,base
  1) = ( Wt 1
Wt 1,base
  1) + ↵1[ Et
Et,base
  ( Wt 1
Wt 1,base
)↵2 ] (3.1)
where the numerators Wt and Et denote the real wage and employment rate
in year t of the policy scenario. The denominator subscript base refers to
same variables in the baseline forecast without the shock.
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The above equation can be interpreted as follows: if the proposed policy
drives employment Et above (below) the baseline level, the deviation in year-
to-year real wages will also increase (decrese). The wage response can be
modified by positive parameters ↵1 and ↵2. The former controls the speed of
adjustment — that is, the time it takes for the impact on employment to be
fully transformed to changes in real wages. A non-zero value for ↵2 deviates
employment permanently from its forecast path. In that case, wages in year
t are determined by both the prevailing level of employment in year t and
the labour supply that was available at the wages of t-1. Now, if the policy
proposal drives wages high (low) enough in year t-1, workers will continue to
supply an above (below) baseline level of labour also in year t.
3.3 Back-of-the-envelope notation
The FINAGE model is based on the work of Centre of Policy Studies in Victo-
ria University, particularly the VU-National dynamic model of the Australian
economy (Dixon and Rimmer, 2001). An essential part of their CGE mo-
delling fashion is explaining the results with a stylized back-of-the-envelope
(BOTE) version of the full-scale model. It outlines both the key mechanisms
behind the results and the interactions that take place within the economy.
Furthermore, it o↵ers the reader a convincing validation that the complex
full-scale model performs the calculations correctly, is consistent with eco-
nomic theory, and is based on a sound set of data. In the FINAGE model,
the short-run production function of the economy is determined by:
Y = A ⇤ F (K,L) (3.2)
According to equation (3.2), GDP is defined by a technology parameter A
and a function of capital K and e↵ective labour L. Following the BOTE model
by Dixon and Rimmer (2002), the economy is next assumed to consist only
of two goods: Good X that is domestically produced and exported and Good
M that is imported. The only tax considered here is a tari↵ on imports. It
is also assumed that the labour input by workers is compensated according
to the value of its marginal product. This gives:
W = PX ⇤ A ⇤ FL (3.3)
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where W is the nominal wage rate, PX the price of Good X and FL the
marginal product of labour. Next, a deflator indicating the price changes is
defined as:
Pc = P
 
X ⇤ P (1  )M ⇤ Tc (3.4)
where Pc is the price deflator for consumption, PM is the price of Good M, Tc
is the power (1 + ad valorem rate) of tari↵ and   is a positive parameter that
shows the proportion in which Good X and Good M are being consumed.
Dividing the nominal wage rate in equation (3.3) with the price deflator in
equation (3.4) gives the real wage rate Wr:
Wr =
1
Tc
⇤ (PX
PM
)(1  ) ⇤ A ⇤ Fl(K
L
) (3.5)
Equation (3.5) can then be used to anticipate the direction and magnitude
of the main tari↵ impacts. As the real wage level is fixed in the short-run, all
changes can be isolated to the right-hand-side of the equation. Introducing
a new tari↵ leads to a certain drop in 1/Tc as the ad valorem rate increases.
The price of exports PX relative to the price of imports PM is the terms
of trade component. It is of central interest when assessing a tari↵ policy.
It is determined by several variables such as export and import demand
elasticities, exchange rates, and relative market powers. A large coalition like
the EU can draw substantial terms of trade improvements from erecting trade
barriers as the diminishing demand for imports lowers their world market
price. On the other hand, tari↵s will hamper the e cient allocation of global
resources and cause technology coe cient A to decrease. Now, if the increase
in terms of trade is not large enough to compensate for the reductions in
1/Tc and A, there needs to be an increase in Fl(
K
L ). As the short-run level of
capital K is also fixed, the only way for Fl to increase is through a temporary
drop in labour L.
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4.1 Trade volume
Some additional information is required to quantify the tari↵. The main
data source for this study is the OECD inter-country input-output database
(OECD, 2015). Input-output (IO) tables are used to evaluate the interde-
pendencies between di↵erent industrial sectors and end users, either within
a country or between countries through international trade. A stylized rep-
resentation is available in Table 4.1. Columns specify the intermediate cost
structure: each cell xij tells how many units from sector i, domestic or im-
ported, is needed in sector j in order to produce the total output Xj. The
basic unit is millions of US dollars. Rows specify the total income for each
sector from delivering its output either to satisfy the final demand Y or the
intermediate demand from other sectors. The sum of elements in a column is
always equal to the sum of elements in its respective row, creating a balanced,
one-year representation of the economy.
The OECD database was selected due to good compatibility with the
FINAGE industry aggregation and a high level of country detail compared
to many other available sources. The OECD trade data is aggregated to
34 industries and 61 countries, listed in Appendix A. Rest of the world is
included as a single component (RoW) for a better global coverage. From
the IO data, the total value of imports from all non-EU countries to Finland
is extracted separately for each sector. The base year is 2011, which at the
time of writing is the newest data set available.
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Intermediate demand Final demand
Sector 1 Sector 2 . . . Sector N C+I+G+X Output
Sector 1 x11 x12 . . . x1n Y1 = X1
Sector 2 x21 x22 . . . x2n Y2 = X2
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
Sector N xn1 xn2 . . . xnn Yn = Xn
Value added W1 W2 . . . Wn
= = =
Output X1 X2 . . . Xn
Table 4.1: A stylized input-output table.
4.2 Carbon content
The amount of CO2 embodied in trade is computed following the environmen-
tally extended input-output model by Koskela et al. (2011). The emission
intensity per (monetary) unit of output is first determined for each industry,
and multiplied by the volume of trade between Finland and non-EU regions.
The total climate impact is the sum of direct and indirect emissions. The
direct emissions stem from the burning of fossil fuels during the production
process, whereas the indirect emissions are embodied in intermediate goods.
Koskela et al. make a simplifying assumption that all imports are pro-
duced with the same environmental impacts and an identical composition
of intermediate products as equivalent domestic goods. The authors con-
clude that it leads to an underestimation of foreign emission intensities. This
shortcoming, in fact, is well suited for the assessment of EU carbon tari↵s.
If the tari↵s are introduced, they are most likely based on some general EU
benchmark value below the actual emissions. This is in order to minimize
the administrative burden and the protectionist appearance of the policy.
Therefore, this study follows the simplification but calculates the industry-
specific emission intensities as averages for the entire EU, whereas Koskela
et al. only use the Finnish production technology as a reference.
First, a coe cient for the direct emissions from each sector is calculated
by dividing total process emissions by total sector output:
E =
CO2 (tonnes)
Output (millions of USD)
(4.1)
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where E forms a vector of 34 elements, one for each of the OECD industries.
The required emission data are obtained from the Eurostat Air Emission
Accounts (Eurostat, 2016).
The indirect emissions are traced along the supply chain by applying the
input-output analysis of Leontief (1970). A structural matrix of the economy
is first constructed from the OECD data by dividing each input in a column
by the corresponding total output:
aij =
xij
Xj
(4.2)
where aij is a technical input coe cient. It determines the amount of goods
from industry i needed to produce a single unit — one dollars’ worth — of
output in industry j. The obtained 34x34 matrix is illustrated in Table 4.2.
It needs to be constructed separately for the domestic and imported interme-
diates, which are then summed together for the total material requirement.
From
Sector 1 Sector 2 · · · Sector N8>><>>:
2664
3775
Sector 1 a12 a12 · · · a1n
Sector 2 a22 a12 · · · a2n
...
...
...
. . .
...
Sector N an2 a12 · · · ann
Into
Table 4.2: The structural matrix of the economy.
The supply chain is still only partially covered. The structural matrix
merely compiles the direct input requirements from each industry. However,
producing the intermediate product aij also needs inputs, which requires
inputs, and so forth. The structural matrix can be re-written as a set of
linear equations:
X1   a11X1   a12X2 · · ·   a1nXn = Y1
X2   a21X1   a22X2 · · ·   a2nXn = Y2
...
...
...
...
...
Xn   an1X1   an2X2 · · ·   annXn = Yn
(4.3)
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And in a general form as:
Xi =
X
j
aijXj + Yi, i = 1 . . . n (4.4)
Equations (4.3) and (4.4) present the circular connections within the econ-
omy. The total output Xi in each sector 1 . . . n must satisfy both the cor-
responding final demand Yi and the intermediate requirements from all pro-
ducing sectors. The intermediate demand from other sectors is always in a
fixed proportion to their total level of output Xj. Transforming equation
(4.4) to matrix notation gives:
X = AX + Y (4.5)
Which in a stylized and rearranged form can be written as:
X = Y (I   A) 1 (4.6)
where I is an identity matrix. The (I   A) 1 is also known as the Leontief
inverse or the total requirement matrix. It is an expansion of the technical
coe cient matrix: each element in a row is a multiplier that specifies the
requirement from that sector in order to produce one unit of final demand
in every sector. Similarly, and more importantly for this study, each column
now specifies the input requirements from all other sectors that are needed
to produce one unit of final demand in that specific sector. The inverse
matrix can then be multiplied by the emission intensity vector E, in order
to determine the total climate impact per unit of output. The results are
presented in Table 4.3 below.
Finally, the extended input-output model can be written out in its entirety
as:
f tot = E(I   A) 1ers (4.7)
where f tot denotes the total amount of direct and indirect emissions embodied
in imports, E(I   A) 1 forms the carbon content coe cients, and ers is the
value of trade extracted from the OECD data.
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Industry CO2 content, kg/
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 0,49
Mining and quarrying 0,57
Food products, beverages and tobacco 0,39
Wood and products of wood and cork 0,38
Pulp, paper, paper products and printing 0,49
Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel 0,79
Chemicals and chemical products 0,67
Rubber and plastics products 0,42
Other non-metallic mineral products 1,50
Basic metals 0,98
Fabricated metal products 0,42
Machinery and equipment 0,33
Electricity, gas and water supply 2,28
Computer and electronic equipment 0,28
Transport and storage 0,63
Table 4.3: Embodied carbon in relevant sectors.
4.3 Quantifying the shock
In order to determine the size of the carbon tari↵, the amount of imported
CO2 needs to be multiplied by the price of European emission allowances.
The estimate for EU ETS allowance price is taken from a model compari-
son study by Knopf et al. (2014). They approximated the price level that is
required to bring an emissions reduction of 80 percent by 2050. The price de-
velopment and associated uncertainties are illustrated in Figure 4.1. Starting
from less than e20 in 2015, the price exceeds e50 by 2030. This is a reason-
able estimate in the light of the previous carbon tari↵ literature, with carbon
prices ranging from 20 (Kuik and Hofkes, 2010; McKibbin and Wilcoxen,
2009) to 63 (Burniaux et al., 2013) and everything in between (Atkinson
et al., 2011; Sakai and Barrett, 2016). A static allowance price, however, was
not considered to be plausible for the simulation in this study.
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Figure 4.1: EU ETS allowance price development (Knopf et al., 2014).
To translate the obtained carbon tari↵ levy into the TABLO code for-
mat, it needs to be expressed as a power of tari↵, that is, 1 + the ad valorem
rate. The commodity-specific baseline tari↵s are readily available from the
FINAGE database. The actual economic shock is then determined as the
necessary percentage increase to include the carbon component to the base-
line tari↵s. Only modest increases are required, ranging from 1 percent to
18 percent during the entire simulation period. A new shock needs to be
introduced each year in order to capture the ascending price of emission al-
lowances. For the purpose of this study, all administrative costs from the
implementation of a new tari↵ are ignored.
Last, the OECD classification of 34 industries needs to be mapped to
match the 97 industries and 144 commodities in FINAGE dataset. For con-
venience in reporting, the FINAGE industries are later compiled to 15 sec-
toral aggregates. The mappings are specified in Appendix A. Both datasets
follow the ISIC rev. 3 classification, which makes the aggregation straightfor-
ward. The tari↵ is only imposed on the emission-intensive and trade-exposed
sectors. It includes pulp, paper and prints, coke, refined petroleum, nuclear
fuels, chemicals, rubber and plastic products, non-metallic minerals, basic
metals, and fabricated metal products. This imitates the typical industry
classification from previous BCA literature (Bo¨hringer et al., 2012b; Winch-
ester et al., 2011). The tari↵ is introduced in 2016 and modelled until 2030.
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5.1 Macroeconomic e↵ects
The macroeconomic impacts of the carbon tari↵ policy are presented in Fig-
ure 5.1. Two main mechanisms drive the results. The immediate e↵ect is the
increase in general price level, which hikes up the costs of living and appears
as a steady decline in household consumption. The second driver is the slug-
gish wage adjustment. The soaring price level also tends to drag down real
wages, which — along with capital — are fixed in the short-run. It channels
the shock into a temporary drop in employment instead, as explained earlier
in equation (3.5). The drop begins to even out as soon as real wages have had
time to adapt. However, employment remains below its initial level during
the entire simulation period, because the annual tari↵ increase outweighs the
e↵ect from wage adjustment. Higher unemployment in turn causes nominal
wages to fall as there are now more people willing to accept jobs.
The carbon tari↵ boosts intra-EU trade but cuts the exchange with other
regions even more. This leaves total imports well below the baseline level.
Strikingly — and contrary to the tari↵ argument for better global competi-
tiveness — the pattern for exports is almost identical. During the first four
years of simulation, the slump in exports is even bigger than in imports.
Three explanations arise. First, when it comes to sourcing of intermediate
goods, the Finnish exporting sector is highly import-dependent. Thus even
a moderate increase in import prices adds up to a notable growth in to-
tal production costs. Moreover, the exporting sector is an intensive user of
particularly those high-carbon imports that were targeted by the tari↵. A
relatively clean production process coupled with an emission-intensive global
supply chain can turn out to be unfavourable for the domestic manufactur-
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Figure 5.1: Macroeconomic e↵ects.
ing sector if carbon tari↵s are introduced. Last, exports face notably higher
price elasticities than domestic demand, which leaves the export-oriented
industries more sensitive to changes in relative prices.
Aggregate investment diminishes as well, mainly because of decreasing
economic activity. Moreover, the increase in general price level weakens the
return on capital, which also contributes to falling investment. The fall,
however, stabilizes quickly as more investments are used to compensate for
the shrinking imports.
The total long-run impact on real GDP is -0,1 percent. Figure 5.2 de-
composes the relative importance of di↵erent expenditure-side aggregates.
Clearly, the main impacts stem from the fall in exports and imports, but
their opposite contribution to GDP cancels out their e↵ect almost entirely.
Apart from the changes in international trade, GDP is driven down by de-
creasing household consumption and a minor fall in investment. Government
demand is not assumed to be a↵ected by the tari↵ policy. Instead, it is set
to follow o cial public expenditure estimates exogenously. This is in order
to isolate the examination of results only on immediate tari↵ impacts.
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Figure 5.2: Contributions of real GDP expenditure aggregates.
5.2 Sector e↵ects
Tari↵ impacts are unevenly distributed within the economy. All industry sec-
tors are indirectly a↵ected, despite the tari↵ is only imposed on sectors that
are considered to be the most carbon-intensive and trade-exposed. Figure 5.3
illustrates the sector-specific contributions to real GDP. Consumption falls
in each sector, following the diminishing real income. The impact is most
pronounced within the private services and the other manufacturing sectors.
The latter includes all major consumer goods such as food, wearing apparel,
furniture and vehicles, and is therefore more sensitive to changes in income.
These sectors also bear the most notable decline in investment. Export losses
are concentrated to those manufacturing industries that were subject to the
tari↵, and indirectly to the transport sector. Apart from the general down-
turn in imports, the only positive GDP contribution stems from a small fillip
in service exports.
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Figure 5.3: Industry contributions to real GDP in 2030.
Figure 5.4 compares the distribution of impacts in terms of value added,
that is, the di↵erence between the value of output and the value of goods
and services that are used during production process. Surprisingly, the only
winners — private services, electronic manufacturing and the utilities sector
— were not directly targeted by the tari↵, but benefit from the secondary
impacts as the shock works its way through the economy. All other sectors
fall below the baseline level and are unable to recover during the simulation
period.
The magnitude of the tari↵ impact is mainly determined by the struc-
ture of intermediate demand. Systematically, all losing industry sectors are
highly material-intensive and dependent on imported goods, which makes
them vulnerable to the tari↵-induced cost increases. Moreover, the share of
value added in total manufacturing output is relatively small, meaning that
there is only a thin bu↵er to receive the tari↵ shock.
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Figure 5.5: Structure of total output, initial pre-tari↵ level.
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A summary for key industry characteristics is available in Figure 5.5,
where the total output is broken down to shares of value added and interme-
diate consumption by region of origin. Particularly the fuel manufacturing
sector stands out with a heavy reliance on non-EU materials and a small
share of value added. However, the proportion of imported goods alone gives
only a partial explanation for the uneven distribution of tari↵ impacts. Even
a seemingly small share of foreign intermediates can turn out to be disadvan-
tageous if it consists merely of carbon-intensive goods. The pulp and paper
sector, for instance, is a traditionally domestic industry. However, it requires
many tari↵-covered inputs such as chemicals, fuel, and a growing share of im-
ported pulp, which is mainly sourced from Latin America (Finnish Customs,
2015).
The wage-decreasing labour market reaction is beneficial for all indus-
tries. However, throughout the manufacturing sector, the share of labour
costs is insignificantly small compared to the use of intermediate goods. The
wage reduction is thereby unable to spur any positive outcomes alongside the
soaring material costs. The service and electronic manufacturing sectors, on
the other hand, manage to avoid major cost increases. The service sector is
notably more labour-intensive, whereas the electronics sector — although an
intensive user of intermediate goods — mainly imports components that are
not subject to carbon tari↵s. Despite a short-run drop, both sectors are able
to ramp up their output as the wage adaptation brings down labour costs.
Another key determinant in adapting to the tari↵ shock is the ability to
transfer the increasing production costs to consumer prices. The utilities sec-
tor consists of generation and distribution of heat and power, water supply,
and sewerage. Being virtually unexposed to global competition, it can pass
through the increasing material costs without notable changes in consump-
tion patterns. Combined with decreasing wages, it takes a clear advantage
of the carbon tari↵ policy.
The sectoral analysis verifies that carbon tari↵s are not only detrimental
to the Finnish economy in general, but particularly inadvisable for those
globally-competing heavy manufacturing industries that they were designed
to shelter in the first place. Domestic substitutive production will gain some
market share at home, but the benefits from import replacement are not large
enough to compensate for the losses from soaring material costs, decreasing
household consumption, and diminishing export demand.
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5.3 Regional e↵ects and revenue distribution
Also regional impacts are unevenly distributed, following the industry struc-
ture in di↵erent parts of Finland. Changes in the gross region product are
illustrated in Figure 5.6. All regions do worse, but the negative impacts are
especially emphasized in Lappi, Ita¨-Uusimaa and Ahvenanmaa. In Lappi,
the drop is mainly caused by the damage to iron and steel sector, which
in terms of revenue is by far the biggest industry in the region (Regional
council of Lapland, 2011). Finnish oil refining, on the other hand, is mainly
concentrated in Ita¨-Uusimaa, explaining the considerable drop both in local
fuel and chemical manufacturing sectors. In Ahvenanmaa, an autonomous
archipelago, the general downturn in consumption and trade accumulates the
negative tari↵ impacts to water transport sector.
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33
5. Results
Beyond these three regions the losses are less dramatic. The decreasing
activity in pulp and paper sectors is notable in Kymenlaakso and Etela¨-
Karjala. Service-oriented regions such as the metropolitan area Uusimaa
and the second-biggest urban area Pirkanmaa are amongst the least a↵ected
areas.
When assessing the viability of carbon tari↵s, the allocation of tari↵ rev-
enue is by no means indi↵erent. Alternatives for compensating the negative
tari↵ impacts include, for instance, unburdening the tax on labour, allo-
cating money to emerging clean technologies, and steering funds to other
general government revenue. In this thesis, however, these options were all
disregarded as either inconsistent with the previous literature or as industry
subventions beyond the scope of this study. Instead, all revenue is assumed
to be recycled back to the countries of origin through international clean
development funds, and hence modelled as net transfers.
The development of tari↵ revenue is presented in Figure 5.7. Starting
from e173 million in 2016, the annual revenue reaches e700 million by 2030,
following the anticipated increase in EU ETS allowance prices. For reference,
the annual EU ETS auction revenue for Finland has varied between e60
million and e90 million during recent years (Energy Authority, 2017).
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5.4 Emissions reductions in Finland
Carbon tari↵ cuts both domestic and imported emissions but the impact
is relatively small. By 2030, the total domestic emissions decrease by 1,1
percent. The only energy carriers subject to tari↵s are coke and refined
petroleum products. Their emissions fall by more than two percent because
of direct price increases. The tari↵-inflicted general economic inactivity also
reduces emissions, yet with an even smaller impact. Emissions from coal,
natural gas and peat only fall by 0,21, 0,31 and 0,75 percent, respectively.
The imported emissions fall for two reasons: the drop in import volume
and the transition to cleaner substitute products. However, there are some
uncertainties regarding changes in imported emissions. The domestic emis-
sions reduction can be directly computed from the changes in fossil fuel use,
whereas the imported emissions are estimated using the average EU carbon
content as a reference. Furthermore, as the goods that were previously im-
ported to the EU are now destined to other regions, not just left unproduced,
the impact on actual foreign production emissions remains unclear.
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This section tests the robustness of the results. In addition to the core simu-
lation (TARIFF), five sensitivity scenarios have been constructed by altering
the key simulation parameters. First, Armington elasticity — the tendency
to substitute between domestic goods and imports — is increased (ARMI-
high) and decreased (ARMI-low) by 30 per cent. Similar treatment for ex-
port demand elasticity is performed in scenarios EXDE-high and EXDE-low.
Last, the parameters controlling the rate of wage adaptation are altered in
the WAGE scenario. Some short-run fluctuations occurred, but the long-
run impacts remain robust in all of the five sensitivity scenarios. Results
for main macroeconomic indicators are reported in Appendix B Figure B.1
for Armington elasticity, in Figure B.2 for export demand elasticity and in
Figure B.3 for labour market dynamics.
The most profound di↵erences arise from increasing the Armington elas-
ticity. Higher elasticity indicates more homogeneity between domestic and
foreign goods. This amplifies the trade response as consumers are now more
prone to replace tari↵-imposed imports with relatively cheaper domestic sub-
stitutes. As a result, there is a sharp upturn in domestic production during
the first years of simulation. As the level of capital is fixed in the short-run,
the higher demand for domestic goods also gives a strong boost for domestic
employment. Due to the real wage rigidity, however, this can only happen
through a drop in nominal wages. Yet simultaneously, there is a temporary
increase in household consumption. This is possible because the more pro-
nounced shift away from the increasingly expensive imports lowers the price
of the entire consumption basket. Consequently, there is also less pressure
for domestic real wages to diminish. As a result, consumer prices decrease
more than the disposable household income, leaving consumption above the
initial level. Eventually, wage adaptation cuts the boom, and the overall per-
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formance of the economy continues to fall below the core simulation levels.
Lowering the Armington elasticity has a smaller and more anticipated
impact on the results. It attenuates the trade response slightly, but hardly
a↵ects any other indicators. Because the volume of imports now falls less,
the compensatory increase in investment is also smaller.
Figure 6.1 illustrates the Armington elasticity e↵ect. C1 is the original
isocost line where each combination of domestic goods and imports generates
the same total cost for the consumer. The slope of the line is determined
as the ratio between domestic and import prices. C2 represents the isocost
line after the tari↵ policy has been implemented. It is slightly kinked, as the
price of imports has now increased.   represents the Armington CES curve.
The curved shape indicates that in the case of a higher elasticity, a smaller
change in relative prices makes the consumer switch between domestic goods
and imports. After imposing the tari↵, the shift towards domestic goods
under the higher elasticities Q4-Q3 is notably bigger than the core simulation
values Q2-Q1.
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Figure 6.1: Armington CES curves.
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In terms of export demand elasticity, the results remain very robust.
Increasing the elasticity boosts the negative tari↵ impacts whereas lowering
the elasticity dampens them. This can be explained by recalling the back-
of-the-envelope real wage model from equation (3.5):
Wr =
1
Tc
⇤ (PX
PM
)(1 ↵) ⇤ A ⇤ Fl(K
L
)
A lower export demand elasticity means that a bigger share of the in-
creased production costs can now be transferred to export prices. This keeps
export prices higher and holds up the terms of trade component PX/PM .
Now, a bigger share of the negative tari↵ impacts to 1Tc and A are com-
pensated by higher terms of trade. It means that there is less pressure to
increase Fl(
K
L ) by reductions in labour L, which can now remain more stable.
For higher levels of export demand elasticity, the mechanism is completely
opposite. This slightly emphasizes the negative tari↵ impacts.
Scenario WAGE alters the parameters ↵1 and ↵2 in equation (3.1). In
the core simulation, their values are set to 0,7 and 0, respectively. Under this
assumption, employment eventually recovers to its long-run forecast level. In
the sensitivity simulation, the parameter values are increased to 1,1 and 0,4
following Honkatukia and Tamminen (2011). Adding up to ↵1 makes the
wage adaptation slower whereas the non-zero value for ↵2 drives a lasting
wedge between employment levels in the forecast and the policy simulation.
Overall, the tari↵ impact remains very similar but slightly more pronounced.
The extended slump in employment diminishes investment, as the K/L ratio
tends towards long-run stability. The export curve begins to diverge from
the core simulation values because wages now fall more slowly, bringing less
cost reductions to export sector. Eventually, also GDP continues to decline
below the core simulation level.
(
Wt
Wt,base
  1) = ( Wt 1
Wt 1,base
  1) + ↵1[ Et
Et,base
  ( Wt 1
Wt 1,base
)↵2 ]
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7 Discussion
There might still be a case for carbon tari↵s. Despite the lacking empirical
evidence of carbon leakage (Hokkanen and Ollikka, 2015; Bolscher et al.,
2013), the outsourcing of emissions remains undisputed. EU en bloc imports
annually nearly two gigatonnes of CO2 embodied in goods and services, more
than twice the emissions of Germany (Steen-Olsen et al., 2012; Eurostat,
2016). Finland is no exception: the import-related GHGs emitted abroad
are equivalent to 70 – 80 percent of the total domestic emissions (Seppa¨la¨
et al., 2011). The next question is, who is accountable for the climate impact
— the producer or the consumer? A typical starting point in leakage-oriented
BCA literature is that domestic manufacturing needs to be protected and less
regulated foreign factories penalized. The assessment of global trade flows,
on the other hand, emphasizes the role of consumers.
The current greenhouse gas accounting methodology under the UN Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is based solely on production-
based emissions, where each country reports the emissions taking place within
its territory during a certain period of time. A consumption-based approach
would similarly include domestic activities, but add the imported emissions
and exclude the production of goods that are destined for export. Advo-
cates of the latter method argue that the current system distorts the fair
allocation of reduction targets between regions and is the main cause for
the whole concept of carbon leakage (Grasso and Roberts, 2013; Peters and
Hertwich, 2008). Yet, neither approach is problem-free. Consumption-based
accounting is arguably more complex both technically and politically. It is
also inferior in building up the pressure on producers to clean their processes
(Liu, 2015). Hence, a full shift in accounting methodology will be no panacea
to fairer and more e cient emission reductions.
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Carbon tari↵s could be a reasonable compromise. Rather than recon-
structing the entire accounting system, the key benefits of a consumption-
based approach could be achieved with a relatively light — and only tem-
porary, if need be — modifications. Emissions would still be measured at
the point of production, but the responsibility would be shared between
consumers and producers according to global trade patterns. This has two
major advantages. First, the change in relative prices would steer consumers
towards less polluting products, while maintaining the incentive for foreign
exporters to cut their emissions in order to keep tari↵ costs down. Second,
and perhaps more importantly, a bigger share of global emissions would be
paid for. Currently, less than 15 percent of all emitted CO2 is covered with
a carbon market (World Bank, 2016). Carbon tari↵s, or a requirement to
surrender emission allowances at the border, would include imports to the
system. As the increasing costs of trade are transferred to domestic market
prices, also the consumer would pay for a fairer share of one’s actual carbon
footprint.
In practice, sharing the responsibility between producers and consumers
boils down to balancing the roles between developing and developed coun-
tries. The debate is essentially a matter of historic emissions, but has more
recent aspects to it as well. According to a global database constructed by
Peters et al. (2011), the net emission transfers embodied in international
trade from developing to developed (Annex B) countries quadrupled during
1990 – 2008. For some rich countries, imported emissions are growing faster
than domestic emissions are being abated (Energy and Climate Change Com-
mittee, 2012). Therefore, even if the trade-related emissions are not directly
included in the accounting methodology, their central role in climate debate
is well-founded.
To fix the unequal incidence, the UNFCCC calls for common but di↵er-
entiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (UN, 1992). In short, the
main task in developing countries should be pursuing sustainable develop-
ment while the developed world handles a bulk of the emission reductions.
Carbon tari↵ doesn’t automatically comply, and if poorly designed, it might
even widen the gap. At worst, tari↵ cuts market access from those developing
export sectors that are either in the middle of recovering from the recent eco-
nomic downturn or even making their first-ever global appearance. The EU
sources 60 percent of all imports from developing countries and is the main
trading partner for 80 countries (European Commission, 2012a). Therefore,
EU’s influence in international trade is not easily overestimated. At best,
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however, carbon tari↵ contributes as a new source of climate finance, for
which there is a crying need. During the historic climate convention COP21
in Paris, the collective goal of 100 billion mobilized annually by developed
countries was extended to 2025 and defined as a floor target for years there-
after (UN, 2015). In the EU, a carbon tari↵ merely on Chinese imports is
estimated to yield over e14 billion each year (Gros, 2009). According to a
modelling study by Springmann (2012), a carbon tari↵ between all Annex I
and non-Annex I countries could raise an annual 3,5 – 24,5 billion to clean
development, even with a moderate carbon price of 15 – 30/tCO2.
Since its launch in 2005, the EU ETS has been the largest carbon market
in the world, which has triggered the need to safeguard domestic industry
competitiveness against rivals in non-acting countries. This might change
sooner than expected. Most importantly China, the world’s biggest exporter
of both goods and carbon dioxide, is set to start its national emissions trading
system during 2017 (Liu, 2016). The carbon price in the seven pilot markets
that are already up and running has stabilized to around 40, matching
the chronically low EU ETS allowance prices of e2-9 during recent years
(Environomist, 2016; Marcu et al., 2016). In addition to China, many major
emitters such as Russia, Brazil, Canada and Japan, have national emissions
trading under consideration (ICAP, 2016).
The expanding carbon market changes the whole rationale behind carbon
tari↵s. Instead of a mere plug on carbon leakage, they could be used as a bet-
ter aimed strategic tool against countries that are lagging behind in climate
action. Moreover, the pressure should not be restricted only on developing
nations. Carbon tari↵s were first considered against the United States after
the decision to leave the Kyoto Protocol unratified (Mrasek, 2006). More
recently, the former French president Nicolas Sarkozy proposed similar trade
restrictions if Donald Trump decides to withdraw the US from the Paris
climate agreement (Davenport, 2016). Especially if the price of emission al-
lowances in the EU ETS fails to take o↵ and the generous cost compensation
to heavy industries continues, there are hardly other but strategic reasons to
bother with tari↵s. Moreover, even the threat of EU having carbon tari↵s at
disposal might have a favourable outcome on global climate e↵ort.
The political consequences of carbon tari↵s remain unpredictable. A
well-founded general view is that counter-measures are likely. The previ-
ous attempt to extend emission pricing beyond EU borders was by including
international aviation. It was deferred after the coalition of the unwilling,
led by the US and Russia, threatened to ban EU carriers from their airspace
41
7. Discussion
(Elsworth and MacDonald, 2013). Yet, even if some retaliation occurs, the
storm in trade relations is likely to relent before turning into a full-grown
trade war. This is because tari↵s are still a rather commonplace feature
of global trade. The EU, for instance, has a wide variety of recent anti-
dumping measures in place for Chinese imports, ranging from solar panels
(European Commission, 2015) to 37 di↵erent tari↵s on steel products (Euro-
pean Commission, 2016). The foreign reactions have varied from re-routing
imports through proxy countries — as in the case of Chinese solar panels —
to setting up counter-tari↵s for European goods (WTO, 2015a).
Moreover, the EU itself is often inconsistent in responding to changes in
foreign trade policy. For instance, the EU has imposed anti-dumping tari↵s
on Chinese goods for being too cheap (European Commission, 2007), but
filed a WTO complaint about price manipulation when China used export
duties to increase their prices (WTO, 2012). China’s excuse for limiting
resource exports was that it reduces environmental degradation. Therefore,
it relied on the environmental exceptions in GATT — the very same Article
XX that the EU is likely to defend its carbon tari↵s with. Eventually, the EU
rejoiced at the WTO ban on Chinese export duties by stating that there are
more e↵ective environmental protection measures that do not discriminate
against foreign industry (European Commission, 2012b). It is obvious that
carbon tari↵s, or any other trade barriers alike, cannot be introduced without
protectionist intentions and only as an environmental necessity.
As this study and many previous cases suggest, tari↵s tend to backfire on
especially those heavy industries that have been their most vocal supporters.
Perhaps the most iconic example is the US 2002 steel tari↵, where the soaring
price of steel led to the loss of 200 000 American jobs, 50 000 of which from
the steel sector itself (Francois and Baughman, 2003). Furthermore, even if
trade restrictions do manage to repatriate some jobs, it usually comes with
a high cost. Hufbauer and Lowry (2012) estimate that the 2009 US tari↵ on
Chinese tires cost more than 1,1 billion to American consumers. However,
the policy only managed to secure a maximum of 1200 jobs, valued almost one
million dollars each. For many industries at home and abroad, the tari↵-free
flux of cheap imports is the precondition, not a restraint, on competitiveness.
Thus far, the European trade policy has embraced the benefits of free
trade and globally intertwined supply chains. Over 70 percent of extra-EU
imports enter the region without any or with lowered tari↵s (European Com-
mission, 2012a). Finland has indeed utilized this, and the share of imported
manufacturing inputs has increased well above the average EU rate (Ali-
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Yrkko¨ et al., 2016). But the deeper integration to global value chains also
involves risks and makes the economy more vulnerable to exogenous trade
shocks. The global economy has reached a level of complexity where the ap-
peal of protective tari↵s, even if environmentally motivated, can be harmfully
over-simplistic.
Nonetheless, if the urgency of climate action makes carbon tari↵s in-
evitable, the EU is an excellent location to start. First of all, having a
well-established carbon market infrastructure also makes the use of supple-
mentary tari↵ policies relatively easier. Useful data are already abundantly
available, including the sector-specific emission benchmarks for the top EU
manufacturers. Second, despite the last economic crisis, the EU has main-
tained its position both as the biggest market area in the world and as the
top global importer of manufactured goods (European Commission, 2012a).
It means that the EU actually has the leverage that is required to have
an impact on global trade patterns. The timing for carbon tari↵s has also
substantially improved over the last few years. The recently ratified Paris
climate agreement o↵ers the WTO a legal foundation to update its trade
regulations towards a more climate-emphasized direction. It is also a clear
high-level mandate to use increasingly powerful policy measures in the fight
against climate change.
On the validity of results
There are still some undiscussed caveats that might have an impact on the
results. First, this study doesn’t take into account the industrial energy
e ciency improvements that are likely to take place during the simulation
period and thereby reduce the carbon content of imports. From 2001 to
2011, energy intensity in the European manufacturing sector improved by
nearly 19 percent (European Commission, 2014), although the lower energy
consumption caused by economic downturn complicates the approximation.
However, a sectoral assessment by Chan and Kantamaneni (2015) suggests
that particularly for non-ferrous metals, iron and steel sectors and chemical
manufacturing, the rate of future energy e ciency improvements will notably
decelerate as the lowest-hanging fruits have already been picked. Thus, future
energy e ciency potential in the manufacturing sector as a whole will be
limited. Including energy e ciency improvements to the study would also
play a greater role if the carbon content was approximated based on actual
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foreign process emissions. Here, the use of a European emission benchmark
is likely to o↵set for energy e ciency improvements in production processes
abroad.
Another missing element is the actual cost of foreign trade retaliation.
The issue has only been covered in a small number of quantitative literature
and is virtually still in the speculative level. A recent modelling study by
Foure´ et al. (2016) summarised the consequences of retaliation to three main
features. If retaliation occurs, it is most likely started by the USA, China or
India, targeted on the European agricultural sector and has only a marginal
impact on the European GDP and other macroeconomic indicators. Hence,
also the results presented in this study are expected to remain appropriately
accurate, even if some form of trade retaliation is provoked.
Nonetheless, even under all these simplifying assumptions and future un-
certainties, the underlying mechanism behind the results remains unchanged.
A carbon tari↵, big or small, will have an adverse impact on an open,
material-intensive and import-dependent economy.
The results presented in this study are consistent with the existing lit-
erature. The obtained values for embodied carbon are very close to the
previous EU estimates (Schenker et al., 2012) and predictably well below the
global average levels (Nakano et al., 2009). Also the tari↵-induced output
losses have been widely documented (Burniaux et al., 2013; Bo¨hringer et al.,
2014). However, the industry structure varies considerably from country to
country. It makes the generalization of aggregate EU-level results problem-
atic and advocates for more country-specific research. Similarly, the results
presented in this study should not be directly applied to estimate tari↵ im-
pacts in other countries. In a more general context, however, the contracting
economic activity reported here fits well with the statistical finding that the
EU is poor in terms of raw materials, but highly dependent of manufacture
exports (Moll and Remond-Tiedrez, 2011), and therefore sensitive to tari↵
policies.
This thesis diverges from previous literature as it uses a single-country
AGE model in contrast to the multi-country models that are typically applied
to study carbon tari↵s. This has some clear limitations. Importantly, a tari↵
imposed by the EU will a↵ect global market prices through various feedback
e↵ects more than what is captured by the model. This might also leave
some impacts on intra-EU trade unobserved. If the EU demand for domestic
exports increases substantially as the non-EU goods become more expensive,
the tari↵ policy might be more worthwhile. However, if carbon tari↵s turn
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out to be equally detrimental to the other EU economies as well, additional
negative impacts may occur.
However, the FINAGE model stands out from the majority of single-
country models as the rest of the world is not treated as a single component,
but instead disaggregated between EU and non-EU data. Without this qual-
ity, a credible estimation of an EU trade policy would not be possible in the
first place. Using a single-country model also revealed important mechanisms
behind the results that are not usually covered in carbon tari↵ literature. For
instance, labour market reactions are not typically available, but here they
distinguished between winning and losing sectors.
Last, an in-depth discussion over the ability of AGE models to correctly
represent the real economy and thereby forecast the policy impacts would
require an entire study of its own. The AGE modelling convention is often
criticized as a ”black box”, where the highly complex model merely conjures
up figures without presenting any convincing validation for its audience. An-
other cause for suspicion is the level of industrial aggregation, which might
blur some important linkages that exist in the real world economy. With-
out an access to full data and the algebraic notation, reproducing the study
becomes virtually impossible and the lack of transparency undermines the
credibility of results.
There are no simple answers to these questions. Broadly speaking, the
power of AGE modelling lies not within the absolute accuracy of the results,
but rather in the ability to capture the course and magnitude of impacts
throughout the entire economy over long periods of time. Furthermore, Dixon
and Rimmer (2009) compared earlier modelling results in the US with ac-
tual economic development. They were able to justify the use of computable
general equilibrium models as usefully accurate, despite the unavoidable av-
erage errors. For opening the black box, Giesecke and Madden (2013) stress
the importance of a thorough back-of-the-envelope analysis that strips the
full model of its complexity. In this thesis, the BOTE analysis performed
in Chapter 3 managed to anticipate the modelling outcomes accurately. It
is first and foremost a validation for the user that the model is functioning
without blind spots. Equally important, a credible explanation should be
available also for any surprises in the sensitivity analysis, as the results are
typically sensitive to changes in model parameters.
In sum, the critique on AGE modelling is often more correctly pointed
to the way the results are presented. When appropriately analysed, general
equilibrium models can indeed o↵er a valuable contribution to policy debate.
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This study examined the economic impacts of a hypothetical EU-wide car-
bon tari↵. The results were modelled using FINAGE, an applied general
equilibrium model of the Finnish economy.
The main finding is that the current industry structure is not well-suited
for the introduction of a carbon-motivated tari↵. Particularly the manufac-
turing sector is highly dependent on imported materials and thereby poorly
tolerant for exogenous trade shocks. As a result, the economy performed
worse on all available macroeconomic indicators when the tari↵ was imposed.
The few sectors that gain from the tari↵ were not directly subject to it, but
either utilize the wage-decreasing labour market reaction, or are better ca-
pable of transferring the higher costs to consumer prices.
However, the discussion over carbon tari↵s should not be limited to com-
petitiveness issues. In addition, they have a potential role in sharing the
burden of GHG reductions and as a strategic leverage against countries that
are lagging behind in climate action. Nor should the planning of tari↵s be
stymied by the possible conflict with WTO regulation. The recently ratified
Paris agreement lays the ground for increasingly powerful climate action.
Furthermore, it provides justification for the WTO to review its rules that
in the light of current climate policy seem outdated. The trade organization
itself has already for long been compliant to an international climate agree-
ment to ”send the WTO an appropriate signal on how its rules . . . should be
employed in the fight against climate change” (Lamy, 2007).
This leaves much room for further research. A possible extension to this
study is to investigate how the optimal use of tari↵ revenue, whether at home
or abroad, might spur clean substitutive production and thereby compen-
sate for the economic detriment. The globally expanding emissions trading
also shapes the future carbon tari↵ literature. The acting coalition might
46
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grow larger, but the targeted countries become more strategically selected.
Also the roles might change, as China, the usual target for tari↵s, is about
to become the biggest carbon market in terms of global emissions covered
(World Bank, 2016).
In sum, carbon tari↵s would still be very burdensome to implement and
politically flammable. Yet preconditions for their use, including the better-
established link between climate change and international trade, have signifi-
cantly improved during recent years. It advocates for keeping tari↵s available
in the climate policy toolbox at least for the foreseeable future. But as the
findings in this study suggest, the argument for protective tari↵s — even if
environmentally motivated — is likely to adversely over-simplify their impact.
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A Regions and industry sectors
Table A.1: List of countries included in the OECD data.
ARG Argentina HRV Croatia POL Poland
AUS Australia HUN Hungary PRT Portugal
AUT Austria IDN Indonesia ROU Romania
BEL Belgium IND India RUS Russia
BGR Bulgaria ISL Iceland SAU Saudi Arabia
BRA Brazil IRL Ireland SGP Singapore
BRN Brunei Darus. ISR Israel SVK Slovak Republic
CAN Canada ITA Italy SVN Slovenia
CHL Chile JPN Japan ESP Spain
CHN China KHM Cambodia SWE Sweden
COL Colombia KOR Korea CHE Switzerland
CRI Costa Rica LVA Latvia THA Thailand
CYP Cyprus LTU Lithuania TUN Tunisia
CZE Czech Republic LUX Luxembourg TUR Turkey
DNK Denmark MEX Mexico TWN Chinese Taipei
EST Estonia MLT Malta GBR United Kingdom
FIN Finland MYS Malaysia USA United States
FRA France NLD Netherlands VNM Viet Nam
DEU Germany NZL New Zealand ZAF South Africa
GRC Greece NOR Norway RoW Rest of the world
HKG Hong Kong PHL Philippines
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A. Regions and industry sectors
Table A.2: List of sectors included in the OECD data.
C01T05 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing
C10T14 Mining and quarrying
C15T16 Food products, beverages and tobacco
C17T19 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear
C20 Wood and products of wood and cork
C21T22 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing
C23 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
C24 Chemicals and chemical products
C25 Rubber and plastics products
C26 Other non-metallic mineral products
C27 Basic metals
C28 Fabricated metal products
C29 Machinery and equipment, nec
C30T33X Computer, Electronic and optical equipment
C31 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec
C34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
C35 Other transport equipment
C36T37 Manufacturing nec; recycling
C40T41 Electricity, gas and water supply
C45 Construction
C50T52 Wholesale and retail trade; repairs
C55 Hotels and restaurants
C60T63 Transport and storage
C64 Post and telecommunications
C65T67 Financial intermediation
C70 Real estate activities
C71 Renting of machinery and equipment
C72 Computer and related activities
C73T74 R&D and other business activities
C75 Public admin. and defence; compulsory social security
C80 Education
C85 Health and social work
C90T93 Other community, social and personal services
C95 Private households with employed persons
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Table A.3: List of FINAGE sectors and aggregations.
ISIC code Industry (shortened) OECD FINAGE-15
01 Crop and animal production C01T05 Agrifore
021 Silviculture and other forestry C01T05 Agrifore
022 Logging C01T05 Agrifore
023 4 Gathering of non-wood products C01T05 Agrifore
03 Fishing and aquaculture C01T05 Agrifore
05 Mining of coal and lignite C10T14 Mining
061 Extraction of crude petroleum C10T14 Mining
062 Extraction of natural gas C10T14 Mining
07 Mining of metal ores C10T14 Mining
0892 Extraction of peat C10T14 Mining
08 9 Other mining and support activities C10T14 Mining
10 1 Mnf of food products and beverages C15T16 Oth. manuf.
13 5 Mnf of textiles, wearing apparel C17T19 Oth. manuf.
16 Mnf of wood and products of wood C20 Oth. manuf.
171 Mnf of pulp, paper and paperboard C21T22 Pulp & paper
172 Mnf of articles of paper C21T22 Pulp & paper
18 Printing and recorded media C21T22 Pulp & paper
19 Mnf of coke and refined petroleum C23 Fuel
20 Mnf of chemicals C24 Chemicals
21 Mnf of pharmaceutical products C24 Chemicals
22 Mnf of rubber and plastic products C25 Chemicals
231 4 Mnf of other non-metallic minerals C26 Metals & minerals
235 9 Mnf of cement, lime and plaster C26 Metals & minerals
241 3 Mnf of basic iron and steel C27 Metals & minerals
244 9 Mnf of precious and non-ferrous met. C27 Metals & minerals
251 9 Mnf of structural metal products C28 Metals & minerals
253 Mnf of steam generators C28 Metals & minerals
261 2 Mnf of electronic components C30T33X Electronics
263 4 Mnf of communication equipment C30T33X Electronics
265 8 Mnf of measuring instruments C30T33X Electronics
271 Mnf of electric motors C31 Electronics
272 3 Mnf of batteries and accumulators C31 Electronics
274 9 Mnf of electric lighting equipment C31 Electronics
281 Mnf of general-purpose machinery C29 Oth. manuf.
282 Mnf of other general machinery C29 Oth. manuf.
283 Mnf of agricultural machinery C29 Oth. manuf.
284 9 Mnf of metal forming machinery C29 Oth. manuf.
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ISIC code Industry (shortened) OECD FINAGE-15
29 Mnf of motor vehicles C34 Oth. manuf.
301 Building of ships and boats C35 Oth. manuf.
302 9 Mnf of railway locomotives C35 Oth. manuf.
31 Mnf of furniture C36T37 Oth. manuf.
32 Other manufacturing C36T37 Oth. manuf.
331 Repair of fabricated metal products C36T37 Oth. manuf.
332 Installation of industrial machinery C36T37 Oth. manuf.
351 Electric power generation C40T41 Utilities
352 Mnf of gas C40T41 Utilities
353 Steam and air conditioning supply C40T41 Utilities
36 Water collection, treatment and supply C40T41 Utilities
37 39 Sewerage C40T41 Utilities
411 Development of building projects C45 Construction
412p432 9 Construction of residential buildings C45 Construction
42p431 Construction of roads and railways C45 Construction
45 Trade and repair of motor vehicles C50T52 Trade
46 Wholesale trade C50T52 Trade
47 Retail trade C50T52 Trade
491 2 Land transport C60T63 Transport
493 Other passenger land transport C60T63 Transport
494 5 Freight transport by road C60T63 Transport
50 Water transport C60T63 Transport
51 Air transport C60T63 Transport
52 Warehousing and support activities C60T63 Transport
53 Postal and courier activities C60T63 Transport
55 Accommodation C55 Priv. Services
56 Food and beverage service C55 Priv. Services
58 Publishing activities C64 Priv. Services
59 60 Motion picture, video and television C64 Priv. Services
61 Telecommunications C64 Priv. Services
62 3 Computer programming C64 Priv. Services
64 Financial service activities C65T67 Priv. Services
65 Insurance C65T67 Priv. Services
66 Activities auxiliary to financial serv. C65T67 Priv. Services
681 Buying and selling of own real estate C70 Priv. Services
68201 Letting of dwellings C70 Priv. Services
68202 Operation of dwellings C70 Priv. Services
A. Regions and industry sectors
ISIC code Industry (shortened) OECD FINAGE-15
683 Real estate activities C70 Priv. Services
69 70 Legal and accounting activities C73T74 Priv. Services
71 Architectural and engineering activities C73T74 Priv. Services
72 Scientific research C73T74 Priv. Services
73 Advertising and market research C73T74 Priv. Services
74 5 Other professional activities C71 Priv. Services
77 Rental and leasing activities C71 Priv. Services
78 Employment activities C75 Priv. Services
79 Travel agency and related activities C75 Priv. Services
80 2 Security and investigation activities C75 Priv. Services
841 3 Administration of the State C75 Pub. services
844 Defence equipment and conscripts C75 Pub. services
845 Maintaining of railways C75 Pub. services
846 Maintaining of roads and streets C75 Pub. services
85 Education C80 Pub. services
86 Human health activities C85 Pub. services
87 8 Residential care activities C85 Pub. services
90 1 Creative, arts and entertainment C90T93 Oth. Services
92 Gambling and betting activities C90T93 Oth. Services
93 Sports activities C90T93 Oth. Services
94 Activities of membership organisations C90T93 Oth. Services
95 Repair of personal and household goods C90T93 Oth. Services
96 8 Activities of households as employers C95 Oth. Services
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B Sensitivity results
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Figure B.1: Sensitivity analysis for Armington elasticity.
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Figure B.2: Sensitivity analysis for export demand elasticity.
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Figure B.3: Sensitivity analysis for real wage adjustment.
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